

Temporal Implications of Database Information Accountability

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Motivation

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Corporate collusion has given rise to regulations for trustworthy long-term data management.

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- Code of Federal Regulations of FDA: Clinical trials
- Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Financial transactions
- HIPAA – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; Canada’s PIPEDA: Disclosure of medical information

Introduction

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- File systems & DB communities

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- **Audit log security & compliant records**
 - Creation
 - Storage
 - Access
 - Maintenance / Retention


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Governed by laws & regulations

Spectrum of Approaches to Achieve Trustworthiness

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


Information **Restriction**

immutable retained records

access control

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
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transparent information
set of **rules**
easily determine **appropriate use**

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“[Information] accountability must become a primary means through which society addresses appropriate use.” (Weitzner et al., CACM 2008)

Restriction vs Accountability

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 - Locked doors and windows (restriction)
 - Sweeping front yard, cameras (accountability)

Restriction vs Accountability

- Home Security
 - Locked doors and windows (restriction)
 - Sweeping front yard, cameras (accountability)
- Bank Security
 - The vault is unlocked during business hours.
 - Easy access
 - CCTV cameras everywhere

Information Accountability

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- Example: Bullae, sigils, seals, etc

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
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

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
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
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The consumers are allowed access to the data.

Agencies using credit reports are accountable for their decisions.


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
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
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


Do not attempt to prevent the lawful use of works they protect by using technology, but rather set forth rules regulating the use of the works.


Tamper-Indicating Seals for Nuclear Safeguarding




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
Accountability \cap Databases




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
Related Work & Security Spectrum




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Info Accountability of Fine-Grained Data

- **Fragile watermarking** scheme for detecting malicious modifications of database relations [Guo, Li, Liu, and Jajodia 2006].
- Efficient **audit-based compliance** for relational data retention [Hasan, Winslett, and Mitra 2009].
- **Tamper detection** in audit logs [Snodgrass, Yao, and Collberg 2004].


Accountability \cap Databases \cap Time




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
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
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
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
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Temporal concepts are found throughout this area of interest.

Outline

- Information Accountability
- Reference Architecture & Execution Phases
- Forensic Analysis
- Refinements
- Enterprise Considerations

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 - provides technology-enabled auditing
 - produces audit results close to occurrence of relevant events
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- **Continuous assurance** technology
 - provides technology-enabled **auditing**
 - produces **audit results close to occurrence** of relevant events
 - achieves meaningful **operationalization of information accountability.**
- **Cryptographic hashing** captures state of database as it evolves.

Reference Architecture Threat Model

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- Trusted computing base (TCB)
 - Correctly booted and running hardware, OS and DBMS
 - TCB runs correctly until intrusion
- A trusted external digital notarization service (EDNS)
- The adversary could be
 - Inside/outside intruders who gain full control of the whole TCB and logs
 - Malware such as virus, bugs, power surge
- **Regret Interval**: minimum time before someone can reverse the change
 - Determined by the specific application

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
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
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
Total Chain Computation Phase




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Tamper Detection and Forensic Analysis Phase




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Tamper Detection and Forensic Analysis Phase



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Tampering, Detection and Forensic Analysis

Transaction
Processing



DBMS state
(Legal)

Tampering, Detection and Forensic Analysis

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


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
Tampering




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
The Corruption Diagram




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
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
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
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
The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




The Corruption Diagram




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events




Types of Corruption Events



Types of Corruption Events



Types of Corruption Events



Forensic Analysis

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- If a corruption is detected, then the forensic analysis phase begins.

Forensic Analysis

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- A *forensic analysis algorithm* is run as directed by the Database Administrator.


Forensic Analysis

- If a corruption is detected, then the **forensic analysis** phase begins.
- A **forensic analysis algorithm** is run as directed by the Database Administrator.
- Attempt to ascertain a **corruption region**: the bounds on the uncertainty of the “where” and “when” of the corruption.


Detection Resolution

- **Temporal Detection Resolution** (R_t): the finest granularity of temporal bounds uncertainty of a CE.
- **Spatial Detection Resolution** (R_s): the finest granularity of spatial bounds uncertainty of a CE.


Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm




Monochromatic Algorithm



Monochromatic Algorithm



Monochromatic Algorithm



The a3D Algorithm

When


$$R_s = 1 \text{ day}$$

$$N = 2$$

$$I_N = 2 \text{ days}$$

$$V = 1$$

$$I_V = 2 \text{ days}$$



The a3D Algorithm

When


$$R_s = 1 \text{ day}$$

$$N = 2$$

$$I_N = 2 \text{ days}$$

$$V = 1$$

$$I_V = 2 \text{ days}$$



The a3D Algorithm

When


$$R_s = 1 \text{ day}$$

$$N = 2$$

$$I_N = 2 \text{ days}$$

$$V = 1$$

$$I_V = 2 \text{ days}$$



The a3D Algorithm

When


$R_s = 1$ day

$N = 2$

$I_N = 2$ days

$V = 1$

$I_V = 2$ days



The a3D Algorithm

When


$$R_s = 1 \text{ day}$$

$$N = 2$$

$$I_N = 2 \text{ days}$$

$$V = 1$$


$$I_V = 2 \text{ days}$$



The a3D Algorithm

When

$R_s = 1$ day
 $N = 2$
 $I_N = 2$ days
 $V = 1$
 $I_V = 2$ days



The a3D Algorithm

When


$$R_s = 1 \text{ day}$$

$$N = 2$$

$$I_N = 2 \text{ days}$$

$$V = 1$$

$$I_V = 2 \text{ days}$$



The a3D Algorithm

When


$$R_s = 1 \text{ day}$$

$$N = 2$$

$$I_N = 2 \text{ days}$$

$$V = 1$$

$$I_V = 2 \text{ days}$$



The a3D Algorithm

When


$R_s = 1$ day

$N = 2$

$I_N = 2$ days

$V = 1$

$I_V = 2$ days



The a3D Algorithm

When


$R_s = 1$ day

$N = 2$

$I_N = 2$ days

$V = 1$

$I_V = 2$ days



The a3D Algorithm

When


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$N = 2$

$I_N = 2$ days

$V = 1$

$I_V = 2$ days



The a3D Algorithm

When


$R_s = 1$ day

$N = 2$

$I_N = 2$ days

$V = 1$

$I_V = 2$ days




The a3D Algorithm

When

$R_s = 1$ day
 $N = 2$
 $I_N = 2$ days
 $V = 1$
 $I_V = 2$ days

Backdating CE




The a3D Algorithm


When

$R_s = 1$ day
 $N = 2$
 $I_N = 2$ days
 $V = 1$
 $I_V = 2$ days


Backdating CE




The a3D Algorithm




The a3D Algorithm




The a3D Algorithm




The a3D Algorithm



The a3D Algorithm



The a3D Algorithm




The a3D Algorithm

$R_s = 1$ day
 $N = 2$
 $I_N = 2$ days
 $V = 1$
 $I_V = 2$ days

Backdating CE

Can use recursive binary search on the hash chains to locate all days during which tampering has occurred.




The a3D Algorithm

$R_s = 1$ day
 $N = 2$
 $I_N = 2$ days
 $V = 1$
 $I_V = 2$ days

Backdating CE

Can use recursive binary search on the hash chains to locate all days during which tampering has occurred.




The a3D Algorithm

$R_s = 1$ day
 $N = 2$
 $I_N = 2$ days
 $V = 1$
 $I_V = 2$ days

Backdating CE

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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Comparison of Forensic Algorithms

	Partitioning		
	Commit-Time-Based	Page-Based	Attribute-Based
<i>Tables Affected</i>	Any number	Any number	One or several of those containing the designated attribute
R_s	Time interval	Time interval	Time interval
R_d	N/A	N/A	Number of subsets of domain values
<i>Segment</i>	One of the contiguous <i>periods</i> induced by R_s , starting from a particular anchor. Contiguous periods form a chronologically ordered partition.	One of the contiguous <i>periods</i> induced by R_s , starting from a particular anchor. Contiguous periods form a chronologically ordered partition.	One of the contiguous <i>periods</i> induced by R_s , starting from a particular anchor. Contiguous periods form a chronologically ordered partition.
<i>Granule</i>	Encompasses all tuples with <i>commit times</i> within the associated segment (one granule has tuples from many transactions committing in that segment).	Encompasses all tuples whose <i>physical location</i> is in a page mentioned within the associated segment.	Encompasses all tuples with <i>commit times</i> within the associated segment (one granule has tuples from many transactions committing in that segment).
<i>Hashing order</i>	Transactions hashed in order of increasing <i>commit time</i> .	Granules hashed in chronological order of "page write" event of the page. Granules not hashed in order of page number.	Transactions hashed in order of increasing <i>commit time</i> .
<i>Segment Completion Event</i>	When the last <i>tuple</i> in the granule associated with that segment commits	When the last <i>page</i> write event in the segment occurs.	When the last <i>tuple</i> in the granule associated with that segment commits
<i>Notarization Factor (N)</i>	Specified by DBA	Specified by DBA	Specified by DBA
<i>Validation Factor (V)</i>	Specified by DBA	Specified by DBA	Specified by DBA
I_N	$N \times R_s$	$N \times R_s$	$N \times R_s$
I_V	$V \times I_N$	$V \times I_N$	$V \times I_N$
<i>Notarization</i>	Occurs as soon as N granules are hashed.	Occurs as soon as N granules are hashed.	Occurs as soon as N granules are hashed.
<i>Validation</i>	Occurs as soon as V notarizations have occurred.	Occurs as soon as V notarizations have occurred.	Occurs as soon as V notarizations have occurred.


The Correlated Page-Based Corruption Diagram Depicting the a3D Algorithm




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○ = Relevant partial chains


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Outline

- Information Accountability
- Reference Architecture & Execution Phases
- Forensic Analysis
- **Refinements**
- Enterprise Considerations

Very Recent Corruptions




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- In general $t_c > t_l$
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- Introduce “envelope” of width I_{max_tran}

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- **Shredding** ensures **information restriction**.
 - **Breaks semantics** of information accountability
 - Reconcile shredding with tamper detection and forensic analysis?

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- The capability to impose litigation holds prevents indiscriminate shredding and ensures **accountability**.

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DBA: Database-Specific Settings

DBA: Nirav Merchant Email:nirav@email.arizona.edu

File

acmedb(/home/tau/software/audit/auditdb) CSI: Rick Snodgrass(rts@cs.arizona.edu)

Settings Detected Tampering

Detection Resolution Unit: 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.

Forensic Algorithm: Monochromatic

Number of Resolution Units Between Notarizations 1

Time between notarizations: 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.

Number of Notarizations Between Validations 1

Time between validations: 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.

Cost Per Unit: \$ 0.01

Predicted Cost:

Tampering Detection:
Per Day \$: 0.02 Per Year \$: 7.30

Forensic Analysis (Worst Case):
One Corruption \$: 0.00 0 Corruptions \$: 0.00

Start On: 7 / 22 / 2012 at 23 : 52

Save These Settings

DBA: Database-Specific Settings

The screenshot shows a software window with the following content:

- Title Bar:** DBA: Nirav Merchant Email:nirav@email.arizona.edu
- File Menu:** acmedb(/home/tau/software/audit/auditdb) | CSI: Rick Snodgrass(rts@cs.arizona.edu)
- Settings Tab:** Detected Tampering
- Detection Resolution Unit:** 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.
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- Button:** Save These Settings

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acmedb(/home/tau/software/audit/auditdb) CSI: Rick Snodgrass(rts@cs.arizona.edu)

Settings Detected Tampering

Detection Resolution Unit: 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.

Forensic Algorithm: Monochromatic

Number of Resolution Units Between Notarizations 1

Time between notarizations: 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.

Number of Notarizations Between Validations 1

Time between validations: 0 days 0 hrs 1 mins.

Cost Per Unit: \$ 0.01

Predicted Cost:

Tampering Detection:
Per Day \$: 0.02 Per Year \$: 7.30

Forensic Analysis (Worst Case):
One Corruption \$: 0.00 0 Corruptions \$: 0.00

Start On: 7 / 22 / 2012 at 23 : 52

Save These Settings

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
Tampering Detection:
Per Day \$: 0.02 Per Year \$: 7.30

Forensic Analysis (Worst Case):
One Corruption \$: 0.00 0 Corruptions \$: 0.00


Start On: 7 / 22 / 2012 at 23 : 52

Save These Settings


Information Accountability in the Cloud




Information Accountability in the Cloud




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
Information Accountability in the Cloud



Information Accountability in the Cloud



Information Accountability in the Cloud



The new threat model may give rise to other temporal concepts.

Also holds for concurrency, replication, and distribution.

Summary

- Information Accountability
- Reference Architecture & Execution Phases
- Forensic Analysis
- Refinements
- Enterprise Considerations

Summary (2)

- Need to be able to **capture history**.
- Need to be able to **revisit history**.
- Need a **trusted witness** or at least **consensus opinion** to provide **continuous assurance over time**.

The Challenge

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As we have seen time arises naturally in many aspects of database information accountability (and in many guises).

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As we have seen time arises naturally in many aspects of database information accountability (and in many guises).

What is the deeper structure of the fundamental connection between temporal databases and information security?

Thank You!

Questions?